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increasing share price, lowering the cost of capital,
and increasing market liquidity. Having evolved far
beyond its early role of public relations applied to
a company’s shareholders, investor relations is
increasingly seen as an asset management func-
tion—one that usually falls under the direction of the
corporate chief financial officer. According to a
survey by the National Investor Relations Institute,
42% of investor relations directors have a corporate
finance background.
This grounding of the corporate IR function in
the financial side of the firm supports the notion that
investor relations is primarily a financial function,
providing financial information to financial market
participants. The ties to finance, however, go well
beyond the kind of information being communi-
cated. In doing their job, today’s investor relations
professionals draw on concepts from portfolio
theory and models of bargaining under conditions
of asymmetric information.
In this article we describe the new investor
relations—how it works, the growing industry that
supports it, and how firm value and market effi-
ciency may be affected by it.
nvestor relations programs represent a
billion dollar per year effort to dissemi-
nate information with the objectives of
I
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INVESTOR RELATIONS IS STILL A
COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTION
All public corporations engage in investor
relations activities. At a minimum, communications
with investors must satisfy mandated disclosure
requirements. The SEC has established rules that
govern the structure and timing of filings such as the
10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K reports, and proxy statements.
The annual report allows more flexibility, although
it must include audited financial statements as well
as a Management Discussion and Analysis (MDA)
that meets SEC guidelines.
These mandated reports provide the backbone
of financial disclosure, but they will rarely satisfy
either the firm’s required or desired level of commu-
nications with investors. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies make
complete and timely announcements of material
facts regarding a company’s financial condition.
Moreover, the listing agreements of the major stock
exchanges and the National Association of Security
Dealers contain language similar to that of rule 10b-
5. Failing to disclose material information in a timely
and accurate fashion can result in litigation and/or
de-listing.1
While the required level of disclosure is sup-
posed to be designed to provide sufficient informa-
tion for investors to make informed investment
decisions, companies can and do often choose to
exceed that level of disclosure. Corporate managers
are finding that well-developed voluntary disclosure
strategies can increase analyst coverage of the firm,
establish credibility with analysts, and help ensure
that security prices accurately reflect the company’s
value.2 Therefore, firms supplement required disclo-
sures with a variety of voluntary communications.
These range from the old standbys—press releases
and CEO presentations to security analyst societies—
to new approaches such as conference calls with
analysts, faxing news releases, and one-on-one meet-
ings with targeted institutional investors.
In developing corporate disclosure strategies,
moreover, investor relations professionals draw on
theory and evidence from financial economics. And,
as the following discussion attempts to show, cor-
porate IR officers and financial economists may have
much to learn from each other.
Increasing Analyst Coverage
Finance theory suggests that stock prices are set
“at the margin” by the most sophisticated investors.
According to this view (see the Roundtable in this
issue), attempts to increase the number of sellside
analysts following a company may be futile.3 Al-
though this view is likely to be true for most Fortune
500 companies, it may not apply to smaller firms with
limited institutional following and low trading activ-
ity. In such cases, increased analyst coverage may
well lead to increased liquidity and share values.
Robert Merton, a prominent financial econo-
mist at Harvard, has developed a theoretical model
that demonstrates that, in the case of smaller com-
panies with limited investor following, increased
investor awareness could result in lower costs of
capital and higher share prices.4 In fact, Merton links
the “small firm effect” that has long puzzled econo-
mists—the tendency of smaller companies to earn
abnormally high rates of return—to neglect by
analysts and institutional investors.
Merton argues that investors and analysts incur
start-up costs when adding a new company to the
group of firms they follow. Providing information in
a form that analysts can quickly use is one way to
lower those start-up costs and thereby encourage
analyst coverage. And, given the recent reduction in
the number of brokerage analysts, voluntary disclo-
sure policies that reduce the effort an analyst must
expend may be especially important in gaining
analyst coverage.
In an effort to test Merton’s argument, we
recently conducted a study of the stock market
effects of CEO presentations to analyst society
groups. Following such presentations, companies
with a limited analyst following (no more than six
analysts) experienced a significant decrease in their
equity beta (a measure of market risk) and, hence,
1. See Wesley S. Walton and Charles P. Brissman, Corporate Communications
Handbook, (Clark, Boardman Callaghan, 1991) for a thorough discussion of the
duty to disclose.
2. For a further discussion of disclosure strategy, see Baruch Lev, “Information
Disclosure Strategy,” California Management Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Summer
1992) pages 9-32.
3. For several expressions of this view by corporate IR consultants and
professionals, see the Roundtable on Relationship Investing and Shareholder
Communication in this issue of the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Summer
1993).
4. Robert Merton has developed a theoretical model demonstrating the value
of lowering such start-up costs, Merton, “A Simple Model of Capital Market
Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, Journal of Finance, Vol 42, No. 3 (July
1987).
50
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE
in their cost of capital. A similar result was found for
the quartile of firms with the smallest market values.
These results support Merton’s argument that inves-
tor relations efforts should be particularly beneficial
for lesser known companies.5
Credibility
The era of investor relations programs that
exaggerate good news while hiding or downplaying
bad news is past. Articles written by and for investor
relations professionals stress the importance of telling
both good and bad news with equal alacrity and
openness. Credibility with analysts does not mean that
the market will not react negatively to bad news.
Rather, it means that when top managers describe the
extent of the bad news, analysts will accept their
assessment as an accurate or unbiased estimate.
Moreover, a policy of providing full and timely
disclosure helps analysts maintain their own reputa-
tion with investors. As one analyst puts it, “There is
nothing an analyst hates worse than being surprised.”
Having a reputation for credible disclosure
means that analysts will consider qualitative infor-
mation as well as measurable and audited quantita-
tive data. Where qualitative information might be
dismissed in many cases, analysts will listen to the
qualitative appraisals of a firm that has a history of
being truthful. Increasingly, analysts are looking
beyond the purely financial in making their assess-
ments of a company’s worth. Strategy, focus, mana-
gerial quality, products under development, and the
firm’s responsiveness to customers and market
changes are all important concerns of analysts. How
analysts react to company statements about these
topics depends on the level of credibility that the
firm has established with the analyst community
over an extended period of time.
Credibility or reputation effects have long been
of interest to economists. In fact, bargaining models
show that if two parties engage in repeated transac-
tions, honest disclosure is almost always the best
course.6 Stated very simply, such models demon-
strate that succumbing to the temptation to cheat
raises costs, or otherwise reduces profits, in subse-
quent exchanges; and, for this reason, “full disclo-
sure” turns out to be the most valuable strategy for a
corporation with an infinite life. The investor relations
profession has arrived at the same conclusion as the
theorists regarding the value of reputation.
Liquidity Effects
Beyond gaining credibility with analysts, the
voluntary disclosure of both good and bad news
may increase market liquidity. Liquidity refers to the
ease with which securities can be bought or sold
quickly with a minimum change in price. The
transactions costs of buying and selling a security—
brokerage commissions and the bid-ask spread—
affect liquidity. When the spread is large, investors
will demand compensation in the form of higher
returns, thereby increasing the firm’s cost of capital.
A key determinant of the size of the spread is
the degree of “information asymmetry” facing the
market maker. Market makers maintain larger spreads
when they believe that some traders have superior
information. Providing public information about a
firm’s anticipated future performance reduces this
threat, resulting in a eduction in the bid-ask spread.
Efficient Pricing of Securities. In its semi-strong
version, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis states that
security prices quickly reflect all publicly available
information. Without sufficient information about
the firm and its prospects, market prices will not
accurately reflect the firm’s value. Voluntary disclo-
sures help move the financial markets toward
efficient pricing of a firm’s securities.
But, why would a corporate manager willingly
release information if it meant a lower stock price?
As discussed above, both legal and reputation
effects require firms to reveal both good and bad
news in a timely fashion. Therefore, investor rela-
tions programs that make timely and accurate
disclosure of both good and bad news could
improve the efficiency of the stock market.
RESPONDING TO OTHER TRENDS IN FINANCE
The focus of investor relations managers has
evolved in response to changes in the investment
and corporate finance fields. The greatest change in
5. See John Byrd, Marilyn Johnson, and Mark Johnson, “Investor Relations and
the Cost of Capital,” University of Michigan Working Paper, May, 1993.
6. A very readable introduction to the theoretical work on reputation appears
in the text by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization &
Management, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1992, pages 259-269.
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IR activities has been the increasing emphasis on
direct communication with institutional investors.
Three trends have contributed to this change.
First, institutions own a steadily increasing percent-
age of the outstanding equity of public U.S. corpo-
rations. Second, following the 1987 stock market
crash and the deregulation of brokerage commis-
sions, there was a decline in the number of broker-
age analysts. As a result of this decline, less research
is conducted by brokerage firms. Institutional inves-
tors must increasingly rely on direct contact with
investor relations staffs to obtain information about
the companies in their portfolios. Finally, many IR
staffs have increased contact with institutional inves-
tors in response to narrowly averted takeover
attempts or proxy fights. In the next section, we
discuss how this effort to attract the “buy-side” is
carried out in a very focused and scientific fashion.
As corporations look to overseas markets for
customers and investors, their IR programs have also
become more attuned to cross-border communica-
tions. Firms with an established presence in overseas
product markets have used their brand-name recog-
nition to tap foreign capital markets. For other firms,
however—particularly first-time issuers—effective
IR increases the success of security offerings in
foreign markets.
Initially, overseas investor relations efforts rely
on the contacts provided by brokerage houses,
banks, and investor relations consultants with over-
seas offices. The objectives are to identify key
investor groups—institutions, banks, individuals—
determine the type of information they need, and
then design IR activities to provide that information
while conforming to local customs. For example,
European investors have traditionally been long-
term investors and have reportedly had a greater
interest in the quality of management and the firm’s
long-range plans than their U.S. counterparts. Com-
munications that help foreign investors interpret the
impact of U.S. political and economic developments
can also be very important.
Besides the increased importance of institu-
tional investors and global markets, the 1980s saw
an increase in the use of debt by U.S. corporations.
With increased leverage, communication with lend-
ers and rating agencies took on new importance.
Investor relations professionals with finance back-
grounds are better able to provide the information
that lenders and rating agencies need. As debt of
various types—bank credit lines, private place-
ments, and publicly-traded bonds—comprises more
of corporate capital structures, the impact of interest
costs on companies’ overall cost of capital has
increased. A well-designed communications pro-
gram aimed at lenders could conceivably lower a
company’s cost of capital; in periods of financial
distress, it could also facilitate the renegotiation of
loan agreements. As lenders, fixed-income analysts,
and rating agencies demand more and better infor-
mation, the role of communicating with these
groups has shifted from solely a treasury function to
part of the duties of the IR manager.
BEYOND THE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION:
PROACTIVE INVESTOR RELATIONS
Today, the state of the art in investor relations
extends far beyond providing information to and
establishing credibility with brokerage analysts.
Investor relations experts talk of managing share
price, or managing the ownership mix of the firm.
Taking a lesson from portfolio theory, many investor
relations programs include diversifying their mix of
shareholders among their primary objectives. Just as
the variability of a stock portfolio is reduced through
diversification, these IR managers believe that the
volatility of their firms’ stock can be reduced by
diversifying the firms’ ownership structure. Just as
portfolio managers reduce the volatility of their
portfolios by selecting securities that are not per-
fectly correlated with one another, IR managers are
trying to reduce the volatility in their companies’
stocks by diversifying the mix of shareholders across
investors with different investment strategies. If
shareholders pursue different investment strategies,
all will not respond in the same way to a particular
type of news announcement—and the resulting
reduction in volatility could lower the firm’s cost of
capital and increase its liquidity.
The most significant change in investor rela-
tions has been an active effort to “target” particular
institutional investors to achieve shareholder diver-
sification. A recent study completed by Equity
Communications, an investor relations consulting
firm, found that 54% of the 200 largest U.S. corpo-
rations were actively targeting institutional inves-
tors. That study also documented that firms involved
in targeting outperformed the S&P 500, industry,
and size-adjusted indexes.
The effectiveness of targeting has also been
documented by OLC Corp., an investor research and
Following CEO presentations to analyst society groups, companies with a limited
analyst following experienced a significant decrease in their equity beta and, hence,
in their cost of capital.
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communications firm. Targeted investors have pur-
chased nearly $3 billion of the stock of OLC’s
approximately 100 client firms. Targeting has be-
come such an important part of some IR programs
that, according to Joe Shenton, President of OLC, IR
personnel are compensated in part on the success
of their targeting activities.
Strategic investor targeting, which has spawned
a small industry of consultants, begins by identifying
a set of companies with financial characteristics
similar to those of the client firm. Knowledgeable
consultants focus on the characteristics that institu-
tional investors use to make their investment deci-
sions—for example, earnings growth rates, dis-
counted cash flow measures, or market-to-book
ratios. Ideally, the peer group will also include
companies that are not in the client firm’s industry.
Since investors typically desire diversification, an
institution with major holdings in an industry may
hesitate to increase its exposure in that industry.
Once the peer group has been identified, a list
of 40 to 60 institutions with holdings in the peer
group of firms is compiled. Data on the size of the
holdings, length of time held, and general invest-
ment strategy of each of the institutions is also
collected. In theory, these institutional investors
should be interested in owning the client firm’s
stock, since the client firm has attributes that have
generated “buy” decisions in the past.
Moreover, given the types of firms these insti-
tutions follow, they are more likely than other
investors to understand the dynamics of the client
firm and its industry. For example, “value inves-
tors”—those who choose investments based on
discounted cash flow or price-to-book ratios—often
have a good understanding of cyclical industries. In
contrast, “earnings momentum” investors may be
quite adept at understanding the workings of growth
firms.
The final step is for the IR officer to arrange
meetings with the managers of the identified invest-
ment funds. Focusing on the narrow list of high-
probability investors allows the IR manager to tailor
presentations to those investors. The targeting pro-
cess is on-going. As the characteristics of client firms
and the investment strategies of institutions change,
the list of prospective investors also changes. Funds
that did not invest when first approached may be
more interested later, so contact continues. Alterna-
tively, an initial investment might be nurtured into
a larger stake over time.
Surprisingly, when targeting institutions, inves-
tor relations officers do not target only those buy-and-
hold investors who make no waves. Rather, they
prefer investors that conduct careful research, stay
well informed, and do not overreact to rumors.7 The
least desirable investors are those that base buy-and-
sell decisions solely on quantitative analysis—the
indexers, asset allocators, and quantitative screeners.
Much preferred are active fund management styles.
Active management provides firms an opportunity to
tell their story, explain their unique qualities, and
establish relationships with fund managers.
Targeting concentrates on institutional inves-
tors, but some companies also make efforts to attract
individual investors, who are often seen as value-
oriented, long-term investors. Two corporate ap-
proaches to encouraging individual ownership of
stock are participation in investment club conven-
tions and investor fairs and establishment of low-cost
investment programs. The regional and national
investor fairs sponsored by the National Association
of Investors Corporation (NAIC) give companies an
opportunity to meet individuals actively involved in
investing. To support share ownership by individu-
als, the NAIC has developed the Low Cost Investment
Plan. This program allows individuals to invest small
amounts in a set of participating corporations. Once
an account has been established—usually by buying
one share of stock and enrolling in the participating
firm’s dividend reinvestment plan—investments of as
little as $10 or $20 can be made in additional shares
at prescribed times, typically monthly, without bro-
kerage or administrative fees.
Pro-active IR, then, has had a marked impact on
the IR profession. In many corporations IR is now
seen as an important finance function. But, as we
discuss in the next section, more change may yet be
in store for IR professionals.
THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR RELATIONS
As the managers of the largest pension funds in
the U.S.—funds such as CREF, CalPERS, SWIB, and
7. For more information, see the survey results in Mary Lowengard, Corporate
America’s Favorite Shareholders, Institutional Investor, December 1990, pages 63-
67.
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others—adopt long-term investment strategies, they
are advocating a new form of corporate governance
known as “relationship investing” that calls for a
larger IR role. These fund managers want more
information about companies’ long-range plans and
strategies, new products under development, and
the quality of management. The IR office, as the
direct contact with the investment community, is the
natural link through which this interchange will take
place.
In part, relationship investing also involves
information flowing from institutions to manage-
ment. Pamela Jameson, a strategic IR consultant with
Johnnie D. Johnson & Co., argues that IR offices
have traditionally been under-utilized as informa-
tion suppliers to management. To ignore the natural
“early warning system” provided by IR contact with
investors, she argues, is to waste a potentially
valuable resource. Changing IR into a two-way
conduit of information is one of the changes Jameson
and other IR professionals see occurring in the
1990s. For example, Jameson has successfully used
a compilation of analysts and investor questions to
provide managers with some insight into how the
firm was perceived on the Street; in a few cases, it
served to alert managers to potential problems.
Lou Thompson, President of the National In-
vestor Relations Institute (NIRI), notes another rela-
tively new development—one in which IR people
provide more non-financial information to analysts.
As a company changes its strategic direction and
exploits opportunities abroad, it becomes increas-
ingly important to explain its strategy, its new mar-
kets, and the competitive advantages it brings to those
markets. The more complex the firm and its environ-
ment, the more important are these non-financial
variables in enabling analysts to understand the firm
and then present its full value to their investor
following. Presenting non-financial information
places new demands on IR professionals and re-
quires a much different set of skills than were called
for in the past.
CONCLUSION
With the increased importance of institutional
investors, there has been a growing recognition
among managers that the corporate investor rela-
tions function must adapt to the changes in informa-
tion gathering and analysis now occurring in the
marketplace. As OLC’s Joe Shenton puts it, “We have
seen a 180 degree shift away from public relations-
based IR to a finance-based IR at almost all sophis-
ticated companies.”
This new emphasis on a financially-based IR is
having a marked impact on IR professionals. First,
they are expected to communicate directly with
targeted groups of institutional investors, debtholders,
and international investors, providing kinds of infor-
mation previously available through brokerage house
analysts. Second, communication with institutional
investors is increasingly comprised of “soft” infor-
mation about the firm’s future plans and strategies.
Third, within the corporation the importance of the
investor relations function is growing, as its potential
impact on share price is recognized. Thus, the IR
profession is shifting away from its old image of
“promotion” and public relations, and preparing to
play a more significant role in the corporation and
its quest for value.
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